

INTO THE TRENCHES?

There are growing signs that the current trade dispute could be the beginning of something worse.

IN A NUTSHELL

- _ Trade talks between China and the U.S. stumbled last week.
- _ A compromise might still be possible.
- _ But unless a deal can be struck quickly in the coming weeks, markets will need to prepare themselves for an extended period of economic trench warfare.

Over the past year or so, we have repeatedly described recent U.S. trade policy as "fundamentally misguided and frighteningly uninformed" (e.g. [CIO Perspectives: Too early to panic](#) as of 8/1/18). "So what?" we and others in financial markets have been asking for almost as long. As anyone who has ever bought a used car will know, one side being ill-informed can be quite helpful in getting to a quick, if not necessarily particularly satisfactory, deal.

In the case of trade talks between China and the U.S., there was certainly the potential for such a bargain. China would agree to buy more U.S. goods and services. Unlike the market economies of other countries, the Chinese state can still dictate to a large extent where goods are sourced, however damaging that might be to global economic efficiency. Simultaneously, China would make some policy changes, some of them purely cosmetic, but some of them bringing forward quite fundamental adjustments that make sense for the country anyways. Making intellectual property rights easier to enforce looked like one such example. U.S. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, would declare victory and enter the 2020 presidential election campaign with a win under his belt.

Such a benign scenario is still possible. But the probability of it materializing is probably receding by the day. Unless a deal can be struck quickly in the coming weeks, markets will need to prepare themselves for an extended period of economic trench warfare. And large listed U.S. companies in particular could well find themselves in the line of fire.

This reflects some worrying political trends in both the U.S. and China in recent months. In Washington in particular, there appears to be limited understanding of the incentives Beijing has to strike a deal – and how these are changing. This increases the scope for miscalculations, with potentially far reaching consequences.

The U.S. political economy around trade has shifted dramatically over the past three years, and probably continues to do so with every quarter that passes. 2020 is shaping up as a contest of who can be harsher on China between Mr. Trump and whoever Democrats end up nominating. Given that dynamic, delays increase the threshold any deal will need to pass to satisfy China hawks. Worryingly, even a growing number of traditionally China-friendly U.S. business leaders appear to be thinking that a short period of tariffs causing pain is a prize worth paying, if it results in long-term policy changes in China.¹

So, what can China do to stop this dynamic? Up until now, its strategy appears to have been to wait, strategically inflict pain, delay and hope U.S. pressure eventually goes away. As "The Economist" noted its retaliatory measures so far already came with quite a high cost at home: "China's choice of tariffs seems designed to deter escalation at any cost. Only regimes with no voters to satisfy can run that risk. The lesson is clear: if you start a trade war, fight a democracy, not an autocracy."²

¹ As Gillian Tett recently noted in the Financial Times, "even if the current war of words with China ends with a "deal", almost nobody thinks that the bigger fight will be off. Far from it: the Milken event heard endless predictions that China and America are heading for years of conflict due to fundamental strategic rivalries. This might seem obvious. But these words were not being tossed around five years ago; back then, executive chatter was all about global supply chains." See: <https://www.ft.com/content/5a47e5f2-71b5-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5>

² <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/04/27/why-you-should-never-start-a-trade-war-with-an-autocracy>

Well, that hasn't worked and events of the past week appear to have changed that Beijing calculus. Given China's history during the past two centuries, its leadership is understandably reluctant to be seen to make "concessions" to Western powers under duress – let alone to simply allow a foreign power to dictate Chinese laws. And the mere fact that Washington would publicly make such demands reeks of national humiliation.

Instead it must now be tempting for Beijing to change tack. For one thing, China does have a much longer time horizon. Unlike Trump, President Xi and whoever else has influence these days in the Politburo over trade does not need to be overly concerned about what might happen in 2019 or 2020. Short-term economic and political pain might well be worth it – if it promises gains in 10 or 15 years, or conversely, if the alternative is much worse.

Of course, that is the mirror image of what some in the U.S. are hoping. And it is also precisely the sort of aggressive posturing in the hope of securing concessions that is often at the heart of escalating conflicts between states. The nature of trade wars (like actual wars) is that they foster nationalist sentiment and jingoism. The first shots are fired in the hope of quick victories. And before you know it, both sides are stuck in the trenches, with no obvious and politically feasible way out. That point, we fear, could rapidly be approaching. In the coming days and weeks. We will watch carefully for signs that the Trump administration is starting to understand the gravity and urgency of the situation – while preparing contingency plans and analyses in case that it does not. In the meantime, we would simply point out that the downside risks to U.S. equities for now outweigh the potential upside.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

The brand DWS represents DWS Group GmbH & Co. KGaA and any of its subsidiaries, such as DWS Distributors, Inc., which offers investment products, or DWS Investment Management Americas Inc. and RREEF America L.L.C., which offer advisory services.

This document has been prepared without consideration of the investment needs, objectives or financial circumstances of any investor. Before making an investment decision, investors need to consider, with or without the assistance of an investment adviser, whether the investments and strategies described or provided by Deutsche Bank, are appropriate, in light of their particular investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances. Furthermore, this document is for information/discussion purposes only and does not and is not intended to constitute an offer, recommendation or solicitation to conclude a transaction or the basis for any contract to purchase or sell any security, or other instrument, or for Deutsche Bank to enter into or arrange any type of transaction as a consequence of any information contained herein and should not be treated as giving investment advice. Deutsche Bank AG, including its subsidiaries and affiliates, does not provide legal, tax or accounting advice. This communication was prepared solely in connection with the promotion or marketing, to the extent permitted by applicable law, of the transaction or matter addressed herein, and was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be relied upon, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any U.S. federal tax penalties. The recipient of this communication should seek advice from an independent tax advisor regarding any tax matters addressed herein based on its particular circumstances. Investments with Deutsche Bank are not guaranteed, unless specified. Although information in this document has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, we do not guarantee its accuracy, completeness or fairness, and it should not be relied upon as such. All opinions and estimates herein, including forecast returns, reflect our judgment on the date of this report, are subject to change without notice and involve a number of assumptions which may not prove valid.

Investments are subject to various risks, including market fluctuations, regulatory change, counterparty risk, possible delays in repayment and loss of income and principal invested. The value of investments can fall as well as rise and you may not recover the amount originally invested at any point in time. Furthermore, substantial fluctuations of the value of the investment are possible even over short periods of time. Further, investment in international markets can be affected by a host of factors, including political or social conditions, diplomatic relations, limitations or removal of funds or assets or imposition of (or change in) exchange control or tax regulations in such markets. Additionally, investments denominated in an alternative currency will be subject to currency risk, changes in exchange rates which may have an adverse effect on the value, price or income of the investment. This document does not identify all the risks (direct and indirect) or other considerations which might be material to you when entering into a transaction. The terms of an investment may be exclusively subject to the detailed provisions, including risk considerations, contained in the Offering Documents. When making an investment decision, you should rely on the final documentation relating to the investment and not the summary contained in this document.

This publication contains forward looking statements. Forward looking statements include, but are not limited to assumptions, estimates, projections, opinions, models and hypothetical performance analysis. The forward looking statements expressed constitute the author's judgment as of the date of this material. Forward looking statements involve significant elements of subjective judgments and analyses and changes thereto and/or consideration of different or additional factors could have a material impact on the results indicated. Therefore, actual results may vary, perhaps materially, from the results contained herein. No representation or warranty is made by DWS as to the reasonableness or completeness of such forward looking statements or to any other financial information contained herein. We assume no responsibility to advise the recipients of this document with regard to changes in our views.

No assurance can be given that any investment described herein would yield favorable investment results or that the investment objectives will be achieved. Any securities or financial instruments presented herein are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") unless specifically noted, and are not guaranteed by or obligations of Deutsche Bank AG or its affiliates. We or our affiliates or persons associated with us may act upon or use material in this report prior to publication. DB may engage in transactions in a manner inconsistent with the views discussed herein. Opinions expressed herein may differ from the opinions expressed by departments or other divisions or affiliates of Deutsche Bank. This document may not be reproduced or circulated without our written authority. The manner of circulation and distribution of this document may be restricted by law or regulation in certain countries. This document is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction, including the United States, where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Deutsche Bank to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction not currently met within such jurisdiction. Persons into whose possession this document may come are required to inform themselves of, and to observe, such restrictions.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results; nothing contained herein shall constitute any representation or warranty as to future performance. Further information is available upon investor's request. All third party data (such as MSCI, S&P & Bloomberg) are copyrighted by and proprietary to the provider.

Deutsche Bank AG is authorised under German Banking Law (competent authority: European Central Bank and the BaFin, Germany's Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) and by the Prudential Regulation Authority and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our authorisation and regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority, and regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority are available from us on request.

© 2019 DWS Investment GmbH, Mainzer Landstraße 11-17, 60329 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

All rights reserved.